Few ties are as cherished in the fabric of international relations as the one between Iran and India. Ancient civilisations linked by shared languages, poetry, and trade routes generate feelings of timeless brotherhood. The Mughal architecture, food, and even lexicon of India are influenced by Persian. Terms like ‘dost’ (friend) are used in both languages.
However, this story frequently obscures a more nuanced reality that is characterised by strategic hedging, geopolitical differences, and shared mistrust. India and Iran are far from being staunch allies; their relationship is tense, particularly since Iran became a theocratic state in 1979 as a result of the Islamic Revolution.
Based on historical examples, voting trends in international forums, and current hotspots like the Chabahar port project, the idea of unbreakable friendship is more myth than reality.
Ancient ties meet modern rifts
From the Indo Aryan migrations around 2000 BCE to the spread of Persian literature in colonial India, India and Iran have a long history together. The linguistic foundations of Sanskrit and Persian are similar, and historical interactions have ranged from Zoroastrian exiles seeking asylum in India to joint anti-colonial campaigns against the British Empire.
The 1950 Treaty of Friendship established perpetual peace after independence, but Cold War tensions strained relations. Under the Shah, Iran’s pro-Western posture clashed with India’s non-aligned but Soviet leaning stance.
Relations were momentarily improved by the 1979 Revolution, which overthrew the Shah and established the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khomeini. India saw it as a setback to imperialism, and relations briefly improved. But Iran’s shift toward pan-Islamism and its backing of Pakistan in the Indo-Pak disputes soon deteriorated the situation.
India’s close ties to Iraq, a Soviet ally at the time, further strained relations with Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Iran denounced India’s 1990 response to the Kashmir riots as ‘unjustified’ and even cancelled an invitation to India’s foreign minister. These incidents demonstrate how theocracy sparked ideological conflict in a partnership that had previously been pragmatic.
Clashing votes: From Kashmir to nuclear ambitions
These divisions have been exacerbated in international forums, where voting trends indicate divergent agendas. In the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Iran has continuously supported resolutions denouncing India’s purported breaches of human rights in Kashmir. India, on the other hand, has denounced Iran’s nuclear program at the IAEA, voting against Tehran for non-compliance in 2005 and referring it to the UN Security Council in 2006 and 2009.
Iranian authorities condemned this as ‘backstabbing,’ particularly in light of Iran’s 1994 objection to an OIC resolution on Kashmir that exempted India from sanctions. Recent human rights divergences underscore India’s hedging. In January 2026, India voted against a UNHRC resolution criticising Iran’s protest crackdowns, emphasising stability, but abstained from a 2024 IAEA censure of its nuclear operations.
The Ayatollah’s anti-Hindu barbs
The personal and ideological imprint of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose speech has frequently swung into explicit criticism of India’s Hindu majority framework, is at the heart of Iran’s post revolution differences. Through the prism of Islamic solidarity, Khamenei’s remarks have depicted India as a place where Muslims are persecuted, repeating clichés that pit ‘extremist Hindus’ against the faithful. This anti Hindu attitude, which is nuanced in diplomacy but abrasive in public statements, has frequently caused tensions in bilateral relations and exposed the theocratic state’s preference for pan-Islamic narratives above practical alliances.
A stark example occurred in March 2020, during the Delhi riots, when Khamenei tweeted, ‘The hearts of Muslims all over the world are grieving over the massacre of Muslims in India. The govt of India should confront extremist Hindus & their parties & stop the massacre of Muslims in order to prevent India’s isolation from the world of Islam.’ The hashtag #IndianMuslimsInDanger magnified the message, prompting swift Indian condemnation as inflammatory meddling. Similarly, in August 2019, when Article 370 was revoked in Kashmir, Khamenei encouraged India to ‘adopt a just policy towards the noble people of Kashmir and prevent the oppression & bullying of Muslims,’ while using good relations as a diplomatic fig leaf.
The trend accelerated in September 2024 when Khamenei declared, ‘We cannot consider ourselves to be Muslims if we are oblivious to the suffering that a Muslim is enduring in #Myanmar, #Gaza, #India, or any other place,’ adding that India was among the countries where Muslims face suffering. India’s Ministry of External Affairs responded, calling the remarks misinformed and unacceptable, and urging Tehran to look at their own record on minorities. In 2010, during his Haj speech, Khamenei asked for global support for Kashmiri Muslims, comparing their predicament to that of other oppressed populations.
These initiatives, which frequently coincide with domestic Indian flashpoints, highlight a deeper ideological divide. Khamenei’s theocratic worldview, which is based on exporting the Islamic Revolution, sees India’s democracy as a fight between Hindu extremism and Muslim suffering. While India has responded gently, summoning envoys and delivering rebukes, such rhetoric has fueled Iranian perceptions of India as an antagonistic state, straining efforts to maintain even normal cooperation. It further reinforces the myth of friendship by disregarding how Iran’s leadership intentionally undermines India’s internal narrative on pluralism.
Chabahar: A port of promises and pitfalls
The Chabahar port is both a beacon of potential synergy and a source of friction, perpetuating myths of genuine friendship. The 2016 trilateral agreement with Iran and Afghanistan saw India promise $500 million for the Shahid Beheshti terminal, which was intended to serve as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia by avoiding Pakistan. A 10 year pact signed in 2024 pledged an additional $370 million, demonstrating strategic alignment. However, US sanctions have consistently hindered development. India postponed investing for fear of sanctions, causing Iran to threaten Chinese engagement. India was forced to shut down its operations and pay $120 million without full returns after Trump rescinded the sanctions relief in September 2025.
Broader stains
Although unsubstantiated, Iran’s claims that Indian tech firms supported Mossad during the Israel-Iran clashes in 2025 add espionage drama and erode trust. Iran’s criticism of India’s Islamophobia through the CAA and Kashmir policies is one example of a broader tendency. Once a lifeline, the oil trade crumbled after India was forced to stop importing due to U.S. sanctions in 2019, moving to Saudi Arabia and Iraq instead. The U.S.-Israel strikes in February 2026 caused a 20% increase in oil prices, endangering the safety of India’s diaspora and its import dependent economy. India’s energy concerns are heightened by Iran’s threats to attack tankers or block the Strait of Hormuz.
A partnership, not a friendship
India’s strategy exemplifies pragmatic neutrality by maintaining connections with Iran for oil and connectivity while strengthening ties with Israel and the United States for defense and technology. Although it avoids Shia Sunni divisions and U.S.-Iran conflicts, this dehyphenation, treating relations independently, increases Iranian discontent over alleged Western biases. Misconceptions arise from overemphasizing cultural ties while neglecting post revolutionary changes: India’s secularism clashes with Iran’s Islamic solidarity, which frequently unites with Pakistan. New Delhi treads gingerly, putting independence first in a multipolar world as tensions in West Asia rise, potentially leading to oil shocks and economic disruptions.
The story of India and Iran is not one of unshakable friendship but rather one of strategic interaction. Historical links serve as a basis, but geopolitical realities such as nuclear aspirations, positions on Kashmir, and outside influences cause enduring divisions. New Delhi needs to exercise caution as West Asian tensions rise, and there is a chance of oil shocks and trade disruptions for India. The truth is more nuanced: two nations split by strategy and bonded by history. The fiction of perpetual brotherhood serves narrative purposes. That is frequently the cost of independence in a multipolar world.
